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Risk Factors for Avian Influenza H9 
Infection of Chickens in Live Bird 
Retail Stalls of Lahore District, 
Pakistan 2009–2010
Mamoona Chaudhry1,10, Hamad B. Rashid2, Angélique Angot3, Michael Thrusfield4, Barend 
M. deC Bronsvoort  5, Ilaria Capua3,6, Giovanni Cattoli3,7, Susan C. Welburn1,8 & Mark C. Eisler9
This study was conducted to identify risk factors associated with AIV infections in live bird retail stalls 
(LBRS) in Lahore District, Pakistan. A cross-sectional survey of LBRS was conducted from December 
2009-February 2010 using two-stage cluster sampling based on probability proportional to size. A total 
of 280 oropharyngeal swab sample pools were collected from 1400 birds in 8 clusters and tested by qRT-
PCR for the matrix (M) gene of type A influenza virus and HA gene subtypes H9, H5 and H7. Thirty-four 
(34) samples were positive for the M gene, of which 28 were also positive for H9. No sample was found 
positive for H5 or H7. Data for 36 potential risk factors, collected by questionnaire, were analyzed by 
survey-weighted logistic regression and prevalence odds ratios (OR) for associated risk factors were 
calculated. A final multivariable model identified three risk factors for H9 infection in LRBS, namely 
obtaining birds from mixed sources (OR 2.28, CI95%: 1.4–3.7), keeping birds outside cages (OR 3.10, 
CI95%: 1.4–7.0) and keeping chicken breeds other than broilers (OR 6.27, CI95%: 1.7–23.2). Sourcing birds 
from dealers/wholesalers, keeping birds inside cages and avoiding mixing different breeds in cages 
could reduce the risk of H9 infections in LRBS.
Live bird markets (LBM) are an important component of traditional poultry marketing systems in many devel-
oping countries. The characteristics of LBM have not been particularly well studied, but are known to vary from 
region to region depending upon the needs of the local customers1,2.
These LBM, also known as ‘wet markets’ have been recognized as important for the maintenance and viral 
re-assortment of avian influenza viruses (AIV)3–5. The risks associated with these markets are exacerbated, where 
large numbers of poultry are maintained with poor biosecurity, as in many Asian countries6. Wet markets are 
thought to be a missing link in the epidemiology of AIV and due to the low-level biosecurity measures, these mar-
kets can provide a promising environment for perpetuation of AIV among various species, including humans7,8. 
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The H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997 left no doubt about the role of these markets as a source of novel 
infection for humans9–12.
In Pakistan, live bird retail stalls (LBRS) are the main outlets for fresh poultry meat, but their characteristics 
have not been well studied. Broiler business mainly operates through commission agents, feed dealers, and butch-
ers13. Poultry farmers sell their products through main wholesale markets, small town markets and directly from 
farm14. Individual stalls are scattered throughout the urban and rural areas; however, in some areas several stalls 
are located in the same vicinity and collectively comprise a large LBM. These stalls mostly sell commercial broiler 
and indigenous chicken breeds, but in some markets, quails, turkeys, house sparrows and ducks are also sold 
alongside broiler birds15. The risk of AIV is higher in these multi-species stalls due to poor biosecurity. Mixing of 
birds from different sources may also play a role in spread of AIV in these stalls16.
Because these LBRS could serve as reservoir of AIV, a major threat for animal and public health, identification 
of local risk factors is important. The most important known factors are: poultry trading pattern2,17, mixing newly 
arrived birds in cages already having leftover birds from previous batches4,18, mixing species in the same cages, 
source of purchase of chickens4, sharing the equipment used for slaughtering, feeding, watering, and weighing 
the birds19, the number of birds sold per day4,18,20, movement of poultry through LBM2,21. To reduce the spill-over 
of these viruses from LBRS to susceptible avian and human population, these risk factors should be controlled. 
To our knowledge, no work has been done to quantify risk factors associated with infection of AIV in LBRS of 
Lahore District, Pakistan using classical epidemiological techniques.
We previously demonstrated the presence of avian influenza A subtype H9 at an overall prevalence of 10% in 
gallinaceous poultry in LBM of Lahore District, Pakistan, with individual town prevalences varying from 2.85% 
to 17.1%15. We also very briefly summarized a number of characteristics of individual LBRS of potential relevance 
for AIV infection, but made only a cursory attempt to relate these to infection status. Here we report these charac-
teristics in detail and relate them to AIV H9 infection status in individual LBRS in univariable and multivariable 
risk factor analyses. Improved knowledge of the main risk factors for AIV in LBM infection should help under-
stand the epidemiology and might improve control of AIV in live bird market systems.
Results
A cross-sectional study was conducted in LBRS of Lahore District. Eight clusters were selected from a list of 9 
towns of Lahore using a two-stage probability proportional to size (PPS), cluster sampling method. From each 
cluster, 35 LBRS were included as elementary units. A total of 280 LBRS were visited and a pool of 5 swab samples 
was collected from each LBRS. Thirty-four (34) of these 280 composite swab samples were positive by qRT-PCR 
for type A influenza (M gene). Out of 34 M gene positive samples, 28 were positive for subtype H9. None of these 
34 samples was positive for H5 or H7 subtypes. Six samples positive for M gene but negative for H9, H5 and H7 
were not further subtyped due to limited resources.
Prevalence of AIV. As previously reported15, the overall virus prevalence of H9 virus was 10.0% (CI95%: 
5.61%–14.39%). The highest individual town-level prevalence was recorded in Ravi town (17.1%; CI95%: 4.4%–
29.8%), while the lowest prevalence was seen in Gulberg and Aziz Bhatti towns (2.8%; CI95%: 2.7–8.4%) (Fig. 1). 
The design effect (DE) was calculated to be 1.56 and intra-cluster correlation coefficient (rho) was 0.016 for PPS 
sampling.
Figure 1. Prevalence estimates of H9 infection in selected towns of Lahore. Map was created using ArcGIS 
version 10 (http://www.esri.com) by the first author (MC).
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Univariable analysis (Table 1) identified six potential risk factors based on the selection criterion (i.e. p < 0.25) 
that was used to develop the multivariable model.
Factors associated with the prevalence of H9 in LBRS. In the univariable analysis, four variables 
showed strong association (i.e. p < 0.05) with AIV H9 prevalence. Among them, obtaining birds from mixed 
sources for stall had the highest level of statistical significance (p < 0.001). Rodents seen in the stall (p = 0.018), 
having chicken breeds other than broiler in the cages (p = 0.019), and keeping some birds outside cages 
(p = 0.036) were also positively associated with H9 infection. Two variables, namely keeping birds in stalls dur-
ing cleaning (p = 0.214) and adding new birds to cages already holding birds (p = 0.173), showed weak positive 
associations (p < 0.25) with H9 infection in these stalls. Sixteen variables (including number of cages in the stall, 
total number of birds kept in stall, number of birds sold per day, market vehicle picks up birds from farm, stall 
completely cleaned and disinfected within last 30 days, vehicle disinfection between deliveries, wild birds around 
stall, avian mascot/pet bird in stall, birds kept at home, sick birds in stall, disposal of dead birds, stray dogs 
Variable Response level Range Positive for H9` Negative for H9 Odds Ratio (OR) CI95% for OR P-value*
Number of cages in the stall Number 1−8 28 152 1.33 0.85−2.08 0.252
Total number of birds kept 
in stall Number 14−1000 28 152 1.00 1.00−1.01 0.338
Number of birds sold per day Number 10−1000 28 152 1.00 0.99−1.00 0.411
Chicken breeds other than 
broiler in the stall (Indigenous, 
Fayoumi, or mixed breeds)
Yes — 20 73 7.97 2.21−28.65 0.019
No — 8 179 Reference
Source of birds for stall
Obtained from mixed source — 18 76 4.40 3.15−6.16  < 0.001
Dealer/wholesaler — 10 176 Reference
Market vehicle picks up birds 
from farm
Yes — 1 12 0.44
0.04−4.32 0.510
No — 27 240 Reference
Vehicle disinfected between 
deliveries
Yes — 1 2 0.57
0.03−10.73 0.721
No — 27 250 Reference
Adding new birds to cages 
already holding birds
Yes — 25 194 3.73
0.70−19.86 0.173
No — 3 58 Reference
Stall completely cleaned and 
disinfected within last 30 days
Yes — 8 72 0.84
0.31−2.29 0.759
No — 20 180 Reference
Keeping birds in the stalls 
during cleaning
Remain in stall — 3 7 2.92
0.64−13.28 0.214
Moved to elsewhere — 25 245 Reference
Wild birds around stall
Usually — 27 243 1.00
0.60−1.66 0.998
Rarely — 1 9 Reference
Rodents seen in the stall
Usually — 11 45 2.67
1.46–4.86 0.018
Rarely — 17 207 Reference
Avian mascot/pet bird in stall
Yes — 3 29 1.00
0.35–2.36 0.872
No — 25 223 Reference
Birds kept at home
Yes — 7 57 1.06
0.40–2.80 0.896
No — 21 195 Reference
Sick birds in stall
Moved to separate cage — 1 2 2.80 0.03–223.1 0.663
No special handling — 26 246 0.41 0.03–4.25 0.489
Moved to separate area — 1 4 Reference
Disposal of dead birds
Sold — 26 228 0.49
0.11–2.23 0.399
Trash pick up — 2 24 Reference
Housing of birds
Keeping some birds outside 
cages — 7 23 3.36 1.39–8.13 0.036
All birds housed inside cages — 21 229 Reference
Stray dogs accessing stall
Yes — 19 164 1.12
0.57–2.17 0.746
No — 9 88 Reference
Washed gizzards
Dip in bucket of water — 26 220 2.80
0.29–26.58 0.403
Separately under tap — 2 32 Reference
Another nearby stall
Yes — 25 214 2.30
0.30–17.3 0.449
No — 3 38 Reference
Number of people visiting stall Number 12–700 152 28 1.00 0.99–1.01 0.279
Stall owned by respondent
Yes — 27 242 1.04
0.45–2.38 0.924
No — 1 10 Reference
Table 1. Univariable analyses of potential risk factors for the presence of AIV H9 in the LBRS of Lahore 
District, Pakistan *P-value based on Wald statistics.
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accessing the stall, washed gizzards, another nearby stall, number of people visiting stall per day, and stall owned 
by respondent) showed no association (p > 0.25) with prevalence of H9 in the LBRS (Table 1). Analysis for 14 
variables (Days of week stall remained open, presence of spent layers, presence of broiler roaster, presence of 
ducks, presence of guinea fowl, presence of turkey, presence of pheasants, presence of quails, presence of chukars/
partridges, presence of geese, presence of pea fowl, presence of pet birds, stray cats in the stall, and washing 
instrument before slaughter) could not be conducted due to zero cell values in 2 × 2 contingency tables.
The final multivariable model identified one variable, the source of birds for the stall, i.e. obtaining birds from 
mixed sources rather than from a dealer/wholesaler (OR 2.28, CI95%: 1.4–3.7; p = 0.029), as an independent risk 
factor strongly associated with H9 prevalence in these LBRS. Two variables, namely having chicken breeds other 
than broiler (e.g. indigenous/Fayoumi or mixed breeds) in the stall (OR 6.27, CI95%: 1.7–23.2; p = 0.051), and 
not housing all birds, i.e. keeping some birds outside cages, (OR 3.10, CI95%: 1.4–7.0; p = 0.052) were moderately 
associated with H9 prevalence (Table 2).
Discussion
Live bird markets are an important source of AIV because they bring together numerous bird species (e.g. 
broiler chickens, ducks, geese, turkeys etc.) in a high-density setting, an ideal environment for virus genome 
re-assortment and interspecies transfer22. These markets have been termed potential “hotspots” of influenza A 
viruses, but their role in human infection has not been firmly established21.
As previously reported, the overall prevalence of H9 in LBRS in Lahore was 10%15, higher than the 2.5% 
prevalence reported from China23, but lower than the 16.5% prevalence reported in Bangladesh5. Differences in 
these prevalence estimates in various countries could reflect diverse risk factors e.g. practices of handling, keeping 
and slaughtering of birds in LBM or the frequency of virus circulation, or may be due to differences in survey 
methodologies. In Korea, H9N2 viruses were the most abundant AIV isolated from chicken, ducks, and doves 
from LBMs, accounting for 56% of isolates24. Similarly, in the current study, 82.4% (28/34) of AIV positive pools 
belonged to the H9 subtype. Our results confirmed the circulation of H9 in LBRS of Lahore District, and empha-
size the need for regular planned surveillance of these stalls to monitor activity of AIV.
No positive samples for H7 or H5 were detected. This might be due to the on-going vaccination strategy at 
broiler, layer and breeder farms, or may be by chance. These results indicate near absence of these two subtypes 
from commercial poultry farms supplying birds to Lahore District.
The design effect (DE) for the PPS cluster sampling method used was 1.56, indicating that the variance of the 
prevalence estimated by the current study would probably be similar to that calculated by simple random (SR) 
sampling. The intra-cluster correlation coefficient (rho) of 0.016 indicated that there is much higher heterogeneity 
within the cluster compared with between clusters25. These values of DE and rho confirmed that there was very 
low effect of the clustering in the data and that only a small difference in the point prevalence estimate would be 
expected when comparing the PPS clustering sampling method used here with simple random sampling method.
Live bird retail stalls obtaining birds from mixed sources (e.g. other live poultry markets, auction markets, 
farm/individual producers) were more likely (OR = 2.28, CI95%: 1.4–3.7; p = 0.029) to become infected with H9 
than LBRS that purchased birds only from a single source (dealer/wholesaler). Birds coming from mixed sources 
have more chances of bringing infection to a stall than birds coming from a single source. The source of birds for 
stall (small-scale backyard farmers, commercial farms, or combination, auction markets etc.) was not proven to 
be a risk factor for presence of AIV in Indonesia4. However, that study used environmental samples rather than 
direct swabbing of poultry. Moreover, purchase of live birds/eggs directly from farm also poses a threat to com-
mercial poultry26. The movement of individuals and vehicles between farms and markets might spread the virus 
mechanically. Our results suggest that purchasing birds from the dealer/wholesaler rather than mixed sources 
would reduce the risk of H9 AIV infection in retail stalls.
The results of the current study showed that H9 infection was more likely in LBRS with some birds outside 
cages (OR = 3.10, CI95%: 1.4–7.0; p = 0.052) than LBRS that housed all birds inside cages. Hence, we suggest that 
always housing birds inside cages is safer in terms of H9 infection. Birds outside the cages have more chance to 
come in contact with terrestrial wild birds (e.g. house sparrow)27,28 and thus to become infected with AIV.
Having chicken breeds other than broiler in the stall e.g. indigenous/Fayoumi or mixed breeds in the stall 
was positively associated with the likelihood of H9 infection (OR = 6.27, CI95%: 1.7–23.2; p = 0.051). Presence 
of these other poultry breeds in LBM has been reported as a risk factor for environmental contamination with 
AIV29. Indigenous chicken breeds are usually reared in village backyards with low biosecurity and therefore 
more likely to come in contact with infected wild birds30. These birds can introduce AIV infection through 
cross-contamination when sold to urban LBRS for cash and mixed in the same cage with commercial broil-
ers birds, which are reared on commercial farms under high biosecurity16. Hence, mixing of different breeds 
may increase the likelihood of dissemination and genetic reassortment of influenza viruses3 due to variable 
Potential Risk Factors Odds ratio (OR) Confidence Interval (CI95%) for OR P-value
Source of birds 2.28 1.4–3.7 0.029
Housing of birds 3.10 1.4–7.0 0.052
Chicken breeds other than broiler 6.27 1.7–23.2 0.051
Table 2. Risk factors associated with AIV H9 infection in LBRS of Lahore District, Pakistan, based on a forward 
stepwise selection process of selected variables with p ≤ 0.25 in univariable analysis.
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pathogenicity of AIV in indigenous and commercial breeds31. Differences in the lethality of HPAIV infection 
among various lines or breeds of chicken have been described previously32.
Awareness of LBRS owners about susceptibility of different breeds to AIV could be useful in minimizing the 
spread.
Adding new birds to cages already holding birds was weakly associated with H9 infection in the univariable 
analysis. In multivariable analysis, this variable was dropped, being non-significant compared with other predic-
tor variables in the model. Nevertheless, it is biologically plausible and the risk of H9 infection could be increased 
if new birds were added to cages already housing birds.
Birds might become infected and shed AIV within 24 hours in an infected market. If held overnight, these 
infected ‘leftover’ birds might spread virus to new birds by the following day18. Introducing a rest day during 
which LBM stalls are completely depopulated of these ‘leftover’ birds and disinfected, has been reported as an 
effective interventional strategy in controlling further spread33.
Presence of rodents in stall showed a significant positive association in the univariable analysis, but was 
dropped in the multivariable model due to non-significance. Nevertheless, implementation of a pest control pro-
gram in LBRS might be helpful to control AIV by this potential route of transmission.
No association was found between various other factors (keeping birds in the stalls during cleaning, number 
of cages in the stall, total number of birds kept in stall, number of birds sold per day, market vehicle picks up birds 
from farm, stall completely cleaned and disinfected in last 30 days, vehicle disinfected between deliveries, wild 
birds around stall, avian mascot/pet bird in stall, birds kept at home, sick birds in stall, disposal of dead birds, 
stray dogs accessing the stall, washed gizzards, another nearby stall, number of people visiting stall per day, and 
stall owned by respondent) and H9N2 infection in the current study. However, these factors were reported as 
significant determinants in other studies2,4,9,18–21,33–39.
Our cross-sectional study was only a snapshot of the situation over a specified period of time and, hence cau-
sality between risk factors and outcome could not be deduced. Detailed longitudinal studies would be required 
to establish causality. In addition, as a comprehensive database of LBRS in different towns of Lahore was not 
available, the sample size for the current study was constructed from a list of administrative towns in Lahore 
and approximate total numbers of LBRS in each town. Two-stage cluster sampling with probability proportional 
to size with replacement was used to overcome this lack of a complete sampling frame and to ensure economic 
feasibility. We acknowledge that bias could occur because available population data were not up-to-date and 
potentially inaccurate.
Lastly, some questions may have been interpreted subjectively by the respondents. For instance, some 
respondents who did not personally observe the wild birds and rodents in their stalls, might have answered “No” 
in spite of other indications of their presence. Moving sick birds to separate cages, may also have been biased 
towards the null, because stall owners may have been influenced by Hawthorne effect40,41 i.e. their answers are 
biased by their presumption of the researcher’s expectations. In some instances, recall bias might also have influ-
enced the respondents’ answers.
Conclusion
This study confirmed the presence of H9 infection in LBRS in Lahore and supported the hypothesis that H9 virus 
is circulating and possibly persisting in these LBRS. A major aim of this study was to facilitate control of AIV in 
different compartments of the poultry production system in Pakistan by providing baseline data for large-scale 
surveillance of LBRS and the results could be helpful in developing a risk-based approach for AIV risk reduction 
in LBRS. Moreover, implementation of recommendations for sourcing birds only from dealers/wholesale mar-
kets, keeping birds inside the cages only and avoiding mixing of different chicken breeds in the same cage could 
reduce the immediate risk of H9 infections in these stalls.
Methods
A cross-sectional survey of LBRS in Lahore District was conducted during December 2009-February 2010. The 
sampling plan and survey methodology have been previously reported briefly15. Two-stage cluster sampling 
with probability proportional to size with replacement (PPSWR) was used24,42. Lahore, the capital city of Punjab 
Province, has nine administrative towns and one cantonment area. These towns were considered as areal units 
or clusters43 due to their distinct geographical boundaries. The sampling frame was constructed from the list of 
nine administrative towns of Lahore with approximate total numbers of LBRS in each town (overall total 14,950) 
provided by PLDDD (see supplementary material). The sample size was calculated using C-Survey, version 2.044. 
Towns of Lahore District were selected as primary sampling units or clusters (PSU), within which individual 
LBRS were elementary units. The sample size calculation required selection of eight PSU; seven towns were 
selected, of which one (Allama Iqbal Town) was selected twice owing to replacement. Within the selected PSU, a 
fixed number (35) of LBRS were selected as elementary units systematically i.e. a starting point was chosen arbi-
trarily within the commercial area containing the retail shops. Hence the study population comprised 280 LBRS 
located among the seven towns of Lahore District selected as PSU. All birds in a LBRS were treated as a single 
flock because they were kept under the same conditions. At each LBRS, individual swabs from the oropharyngeal 
tracts of five apparently healthy live birds (broiler and indigenous chicken), selected at the arbitrary choice of stall 
owner, were obtained and pooled. Each pool was considered as a single composite sample.
A questionnaire including both closed and semi-closed questions about potential risk factors for H9 infection 
was pretested on 10 non-selected LBRS in Lahore District and completed during face-to-face interviews with 
owners /managers of the selected LBRS. Locations of LBRS were recorded with a hand-held global positioning 
system (Garmin, Olathe, KS, USA).
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Pooled oropharyngeal swab samples (n = 280) collected from 1400 birds and were tested by qRT-PCR for 
matrix (M) gene of type A influenza viruses45 first, followed by subtyping for HA gene46. Characterization by 
qRT-PCR for influenza type A and for subtype H5, H7 and H9 was carried out under bio-containment level 2 
(BSL-2) at the OIE and National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease, FAO Reference 
Centre for Animal Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, Padua, 
Italy. All positive H9 samples were further analyzed by virus isolation test and were characterized by sequencing 
for 6 gene segments (hemagglutinin, neuraminidase, nonstructural, matrix, and polymerase basic 1 and 2). The 
results of the sequence analysis of isolated viruses have been published previously47.
Animal sampling was conducted in strict accordance with the national and international animal care guide-
lines [Convention of European Council no. 123 and National guidelines (DLgs 116/92)] and approved by Istituto 
Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie’s Ethics Committee. There was no requirement for ethical review to 
sample the birds as undertaken in this study in Pakistan at the time of sampling. Registered and trained vet-
erinarians (MC & HBR) collected samples following standard protocol. Permission was sought from the local 
Veterinary Officers. Informed consent was obtained from each stall owner to collect swab samples and related 
information. There were no non-responders because all the owners gave permission to collect oropharyngeal 
swabs and answered all of the questions in the questionnaire.
Data Analysis. All statistical analyses were conducted using R software48. Collected data were stored in digi-
tal form using EpiData software 3.149. Stored data were exported in dBase and Excel format for further processing 
and analysis in ArcGIS 10 (Geographical Information System, ESRI System, Redlands, CA, USA) and statistical 
analysis using the R statistical software. Validation of data was done by crosschecking each original hard copy 
form with digital records.
Point estimates of virus prevalence in LBRS with associated confidence intervals (CI95%) were calculated using 
svy command of survey package in R software50. Thirty-six potential risk factors were examined for association 
with outcome (LBRS either positive or negative for H9) by measuring the odds ratio (OR). The survey weighted 
logistic regression was used to fit the univariable and multivariable models, and prevalence OR with CI95% for 
each explanatory variable were calculated using the survey package in R software50. Standard model building 
methodologies were adopted to select each explanatory variable51,52. All tests were two-sided. All variables asso-
ciated with AIV infection in LBRS with p < 0.25 in the univariable analysis were included in the multivariable 
logistic regression model. After univariable analysis, selected variables were checked for collinearity using spear-
man rank correlation. Phi correlation coefficient (φ) for binary categorical variables was calculated53. If there 
was strong positive correlation (φ > 0.5) between the variables, the more clinically important and biologically 
plausible variable from pairs of correlated variables was chosen for the multivariable model.
A forward stepwise variable–selection strategy was used to construct a final model at a specified α level 
(p < 0.05). Variables were retained or removed from the model after considering the Wald statistics with a p-value 
of 0.05 and comparison of each estimated coefficient with the coefficient from the model containing only the 
variable. If a variable was excluded from the model, the estimated coefficients for the remaining variables were 
also compared to those from the full model51,52. After inclusion and/or exclusion of each variable, the new model 
was compared with the previous one by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for a fitted parametric model52.
Paper maps at a scale of 1:75,000 were obtained from Survey of Pakistan for Lahore District published in 2002 
and map showing town boundaries of Lahore District was downloaded from the website of City District (http://
www.lahore.gov.pk/city-government/lahore-map.aspx). These maps were digitally scanned and georeferenced 
using ArcGIS 10 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA). Map of spatial distribution of LBRS in different towns of Lahore 
District was created by the first author.
Data availability. The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are available from 
the corresponding author on reasonable request.
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